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Using the Brazilian case as a reference we demonstrate that since the country’s 
first republican constitution “religious diversity” was legally constructed as a form of 
allocating in the field of religion popular practices perceived as dangerous and or 
superstitious. My hypothesis is that this religious diversity does not at first signify 
pluralism, given that it was organized under the aegis of Catholicism, within the 
ideology of syncretism. Using the constitutional congress of 1988 as an important 
point of inflection in the form of treating differences, I argue that since this time, 
pluralism became instituted as the main legal and political organizer of differences 
and in particular of religious diversity. Associated to the decline of the hegemony of 
the Catholic Church, this principle, by defining religions as relative to each other, 
promotes competition among religious organizations for social influence and primacy 
in their relationship with the state. In this combative context, the “inter-religious 
dialogue” led by the Catholic Church was presented as a political strategy for the 
construction of civic unity; in the Pentecostal configuration this unity is pursued 
having in mind the establishment of a mass public culture, which is generically 
demarcated and recognized as evangelical, based on the proliferation of media 
technologies that produce large publics that guarantee occupation of territories of 
cities and administrative spaces of power. 
Keywords: syncretism | pluralism | social theory | secularism
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1. Introduction
The principle of religious freedom became naturalized in public discourse as a 
condition indispensable to peace. Its protection remains at the base of the concepts 
of emancipation, democracy and prosperity that guide contemporary liberal states. In 
Brazil, this principle was guaranteed in the first Republican Constitution of 1891 that 
established complete freedom of worship, particularly favoring Protestant organizations. 
Nearly one century later, the pluralist constitution of 1988 expanded this recognition 
to all religions. Even so, evangelical movements have protested legal controls over 
their cultural expressions – which appear in laws of silence and urban regulations, 
television broadcasting rules, etc. – and against privileges that they maintain that the 
state grants to the Catholic Church. Moreover, paradoxically, in name of this religious 
freedom, some Pentecostal evangelical movements began since then to impede, at 
times with violence, the religious expressions of Afro-Brazilian cults, and at the same 
time, in the name of freedom of worship, conduct religious acts in political spaces, in 
particular legislative chambers. In the past, the Catholic Church and republican powers 
criminalized “magic” “superstitions” and “shamanism”, but did so in an ideological 
political situation in which the legal, cultural, academic and ecclesiastical elites did not 
recognize the particularly religious nature of these practices. The challenge appears to 
be to understand to what degree the right to religious freedom is still triggered by certain 
segments of the religious field to restrict the space of action of their competitors, in a 
historic-legal context of full legal recognition of autonomy for the creation and operation 
of any type of organization that considers itself religious, requiring only registration of 
the association in a public records office (Giumbelli 2017).
The defense of religious freedom when exercised under the aegis of pluralism, thus 
appears to have favored inter-religious disputes, above all those concerning sexual 
and racial minorities, transforming the particular format of state secularism. Evidently, 
it is important to recognize that the concept of religious freedom is historic. Thus, it 
is necessary to ask, as Winnifred Fallers Sullivan (2015) suggests; what exactly is 
being promoted in its name? In the Brazilian case, it appears to us that the diffuse 
understanding of that which can be conducted in the name of religious freedom depended 
directly on the various political and legal configurations of religious diversity based on 
the legal institution of the republican secular state. To understand the mutations that 
took place in these forms, we conduct a comparative analysis of two moments of legal 
inflection of Brazilian secularism – that of the legal separation between church and 
state with the declaration of the republic in 1889 and the pluralist version inaugurated 
in what is known as the “citizen” constitution enacted in 1988 after the dictatorship – by 
considering how each conceived, defined and organized religious differences. 
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In general, and Brazil is not an exception, legal protection for religious liberty has been 
accompanied in a particular and generally hierarchical manner of accommodating 
diversity. But the configurations of this hierarchy, its arrangements and even production 
of differences, vary historically. To understand the nature of these variations it is 
necessary to question, over the long term, the different mutations in the political and 
legal definition of that which “counts as religion” (Sullivan 2015: 7). Inspired by this 
perspective we begin with the hypothesis that the constitution of 1988 became a key 
temporal marker for a change of paradigm in the way that the Brazilian state and 
society came to deal with ethnic-religious differences. 
As demonstrated in a previous study, Montero (2016), it can be affirmed that  generally 
speaking, until the 1980s, the ruling paradigm for ordering religious differences was 
syncretism. The political ideology of syncretism produced and organized religious 
variety by including it hierarchically within the Catholic culture and Brazilian nationality. 
Since the constitution of 1988, which instituted the paradigm of pluralism, the idea of 
nation was less emphasized than that of citizenship, and in this configuration, religious 
differences – whose borders were increasingly clearly defined, becoming more orthodox 
– began to compete among each other for state resources and social influence.  
I will present a comparative description between these two models of state secularism 
– the republican and the pluralist – to characterize in their broad lines how they 
define and organize differences, in particular religious differences. It is important to 
emphasize that in both cases this involves legal-political and social modes of allocation 
or nomination, which are simultaneously religious and secular, that is, modes of 
defining what “counts as religious” and what “counts as secular”. The background of 
the debate is the very problem of secularism, or of modern secular governance, and 
how it contributes to strengthening religious identities and polarizing their frontiers. 
It is already well established in secularism studies that its conventional theses – the 
separation of church and state and the consequent state neutrality – are insufficient 
for explaining the changes in the reorganization of religious life in a given society. As 
Saba Mahmood (2016) observes, the secular political rationality is constituted by the 
paradox of simultaneously affirming the existence of state neutrality in relation to the 
religious and the need for the regulation of religion. 
We thus see how, beginning with the first republican constitution that defined the 
separation between the state and church in Brazil, “religious diversity” was legally 
constructed as a form of allocation, in the field of religion, of popular practices then 
perceived to be dangerous and/or superstitious. My hypothesis is that this religious 
diversity did not signify, in a first moment, pluralism, given that it was organized under 
the aegis of Catholicism, within the ideology  of syncretism. 
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2. The Republican Model of Religious Diversity
When considering the complexity of the Padroado Real system [Royal Patronage] 
which, on one hand, assured the authority of the Portuguese Crown over the Catholic 
Church in Portuguese territories, and on the other consented to the existence of 
countless Catholic philanthropic, cultural, and devotional associations under the 
relatively autonomous direction of laity, it can be affirmed that the republican declaration 
of legal separation of political and ecclesiastic powers, did not constitute the first seeds 
of a secular political culture in Brazilian society. In fact, in addition to anti-abolitionist 
and positivist movements, the involvement of priests and bishops in the administrative 
strategies of the crown, the guarantee conferred by the emperor of freedom of worship 
to Protestant immigrants, and the organization of the lay public in cultural and assistance 
activities without direct insertion in the state or ecclesiastic hierarchy, contributed to 
disseminating a model of state secularism avant la lettre,  which preceded its legal 
institution by the republican constitution. 
From a legal perspective, the imperial constitution of 1824 established Catholicism 
as the official religion of the state, although secularizing laws and ideologies were 
organized during the monarchic period (1822-1888). The rupture introduced by the 
Republican legal system, which officially separated church and state, placed on the 
agenda the dispute of power between the ecclesiastic apparatus of the Catholic Church 
and the state apparatus by the definition of their respective competencies and areas of 
influence such as control of civil registration of the population, of education, domestic 
life, healthcare, cemeteries, etc. (Montero 2012b). This dispute, which continues until 
today, particularly in relation to public education and the reproduction of families, is 
at the heart of the nation’s self-representation of the principle of state secularity. The 
decree of legal separation of 1890 which extinguished the Padroado and consecrated 
freedom of worship, constituted an important break in the paradigm of the current 
relations between the state and the Catholic Church in Brazil: the official positions of 
the empire could only be held by Catholics, military recruiting and the population census 
were clerical tasks, the electoral laws divided voters by parish. Cemeteries, education 
and families were governed by the Church. Nevertheless, the legal separation did 
not mean an immediate and total divestment by ecclesiastical actors, in the efforts to 
maintain their influence on different cultural and political spheres in the country, or the 
abandonment by the state of attempts to appropriate religious symbols to legitimate its 
own power. 
In legal affairs the republican constitution was inspired by the U.S. model of separation 
of powers. The Brazilian model explicitly repudiated the anticlerical and even atheist 
radicalism of the French system and emphasized the concept of “religious freedom” 
in detriment to the idea of “religious equality” which at the time was not the object of 
4 | Montero - Syncretism and Pluralism in the Configuration of Religious Diversity in Brazil
attention of legislators and of the actors mobilized around the issue. In reality, the 
concept of “religious liberty” appeared to be a suitable political formula for responding 
to the aspirations of the Catholic Church which wanted to be free from the state tutelage 
imposed by the Padroado Real system. Moreover, this principle allowed inscribing 
Christian norms and values as elements at the foundation of the republican laws. 
From a sociological perspective, the political principle of “religious freedom” collaborated 
in the institution of a legal framing that made possible the progressive consolidation 
of a socio-religious sphere that was relatively autonomous from the state apparatus 
that had been inaugurated by the political struggles of the late nineteenth century over 
freedom of education, female emancipation, the Padroado regime and slavery, among 
many others (Lavalle and Szwako 2015). In fact, the principle of “religious freedom” 
offered the ecclesiastical institutions, mainly Catholics, a legal-political instrument that 
would support the disputes for autonomy of the religious sphere in relation to the state 
powers and for the control of certain aspects of social life. In this way, the process of 
Romanization that began in the late nineteenth century can be understood as a process 
of construction of the very religious field as distinct from the state administration in which 
the religious function began to specialize and the formation of a body of well-trained 
religious specialists began to receive special attention by the part of ecclesiastical 
authorities (Miceli 1988).  Removing itself formally from the structure of the state, the 
Catholic Church reordered its efforts towards its own reorganization as an autonomous 
institutional apparatus, stimulated the creation of civic associations, expanded its 
network of welfare and charitable activities and since the 1920’s, mobilized society, 
organizing very popular Eucharist Congresses. In this process, Catholicism was 
progressively becoming a powerful communicative force that simultaneously helped 
to confer a Christian form to the civic-political imagination of the regime and to expand 
the ethos of secularism as a guarantee of religious autonomy. Despite the diversity of 
social actors who contributed to the debates about the secularity of the state, Masons, 
positivists, ultramontanists, lay people and ecclesiastics, it should be noted that the 
actors associated to the Catholic Church, an institution that was organized nationally 
and locally enrooted, performed a special role in this process of simultaneously 
producing a differentiation between the state and society and its mutual constitution. 
At the heart of this process distinctions began to be delineated in Brazilian society 
between private life (the place of the family and religion) and public life (the place of 
the economy and politics), with the secular and the religious constituting themselves 
mutually. 
In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the republican model of Brazilian secularism 
resulted in part from a vigorous collaboration of the Catholic Church in the organization 
of a civil society that was active in the name of Catholicism and of the progress of 
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the nation. Nevertheless, it is important to question how this model, simultaneously 
regulated and produced differences in the religious field.
There is now consensus in the literature about this theme that the legal institution 
of the republican state preceded the experience of Brazilian society as an imagined 
national community. According to authors such as José Murilo de Carvalho   (2002), 
the idea of nationality only began to be timidly experienced in practice with the War 
of Paraguay. According to the author, nearly all the popular movements of the time 
had clearly anti-republican characteristics (Carvalho 2002: 81). Meanwhile, the 
ecclesiastical hierarchies, which at the time of restoration in the 1920’s and 1930’s 
decided to invest in the more active presence of the Church in society and in the more 
effective collaboration with the government (Azzi 1977: 63), sought to develop, on 
both an ideological level as well as in political relations,  close ties of unity between 
Catholicism and patriotism. The study by Sylvana de Brandão Aguiar (2009), for 
example, detailed the close collaboration between Catholic intellectuals and non-
Catholics, active members of the Institutos Histórico Geográfico and the Academias de 
Letras, in the association of the Catholic tradition to an imaginary civic nation that was 
under formation. The idea “of a great Catholic nation” was a recurring narrative during 
the twentieth century, formulated and promoted by intellectuals and political elites of 
the Old Republic, but which persisted in a convincing manner until at least the 1970s. 
One of the components of this ideal, which ideologically guided the action  of the 
Catholic Church in its relationship with religious and cultural differences, associated 
Catholicism to the progress of the nation. Catholic schools assumed responsibility 
for performatizing the affinity of Catholicism with progress and science, developing 
laboratories, technological and scientific equipment and training their students in 
Swedish gymnastics and in civic festivals (Aguiar 2009: 188). Even in the far corners of 
the territory, as in the case of the Salesian missionary activity in the beginning of the 1st 
Republic among the Bororo and among the people of Amazonas in the 1920’s-1930’s, 
they did so in the molds of patriotism and modernity. The Italian congregation, 
supported by state governors, proposed as an objective taking technical progress to 
the Indians, training them in gymnastics and in the rituals of nationality. Catholicism 
was thus explicitly used to cement the sense of national unity and to guarantee state 
sovereignty over a vast territory (Montero 2012). 
To naturalize the connection between Catholicism and nation the Catholic schools also 
participated in patriotic festivals. Children attended military parades and pledging the 
flag ceremonies at barracks. In return, the public demonstrations of faith, such as the 
erection of Christ the Redeemer in 1931 and the Eucharist Congresses held in the 
1920s and 1930s were presented as large and popular civic festivals. According to 
José Murilo de Carvalho (1990), in the competition between the Catholic Church and 
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the republican regime for the representation of the nation, the religious allegories, in 
particular those fomented by the cults to the Virgin Mary, got the upper hand.
The idea that the Catholic Church would be responsible for the moral imperative of 
the nation’s progress implied the need to fight superstitions, idolatry and mysticism 
inherent to popular religions, including those of Catholicism. This fight was conducted 
in the name of science, in particular of medicine and psychiatry (Giumbellli 1997). This 
organization of differences at the interior of the Catholic nation was thus conducted 
at the expense of non-Catholics, communists, popular superstitions and heresies. 
Catholicism sought to be represented with sanctioning from the state, as the great and 
sole cement of the modern Brazilian soul. The major Catholic theme from the period 
was the idea of cohesion in the faith against its enemies: Protestantism and Spiritism 
(Azzi 1977: 85). But all the other religious variations were also seen either as threats 
to nationality or as imposters. In 1944, then father Agnelo Rossi portrayed Judaism in 
the newspaper Jornal do Brasil as an “international danger”, mosques “as an affront to 
our customs” and the Eastern churches as a “problem for our nationality”  (Azzi 1980: 
64). The Protestants were also rejected as “not having a connection with our historic 
traditions”, and of being incapable of offering “a factor of national unity” and  “corruptors 
of the Brazilians” (Azzi 1980: 65). At the same time, the Spiritists were expelled to the 
non-religious field of crime and gross superstitions, because
Spiritism was a movement that caused intellectual predisposition to madness 
[and that] caused confusion through religion and seeded sharp dissension 
within the Catholic unity, so the police must inspect this movement, closing all 
the doors to its greater development” (5ª. Conferencia Episcopal de 1941, in 
Belo Horizonte (Azzi 1980: 66)). 
These examples, like many others, illustrate how, over the first half of the twentieth 
century, the popular magic-therapeutic practices and African possession dances were 
perceived by the Catholic Church as uncivilized and immoral customs. But, it is important 
to note that this vision of the Catholic world was shared by many representatives of the 
state. Indeed, doctors, jurists, police and lawyers among other state agents shared this 
same understanding, which made it difficult to conceive the popular magic-therapeutic 
practices of the Spiritists, the macumba sacrifices and the batuque dances as true 
religious rituals. Thus, although the first republican constitution had established a legal 
situation in which the state declared itself to be secular and neutral in relation to the 
diversity of opinions and religions, the “false religions”, and the “superstitions” that 
led to madness and social anomia, perceived as dangerous and corrosives, were not 
placed among the elements that deserved state protection. To the contrary, they were 
criminalized and became the object of police persecution in name of morality and 
public health  (Montero 2012b). 
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With this mode of demarking the frontiers between the religious and the non-religious, 
the Catholic Church, associated to the state in the project of establishing social order 
and disciplining the poor, can defend the repression of these practices in the name of 
public order without contradicting the principle of religious freedom. These conflicts 
reveal the difficulties inherent to the plan to incorporate differences into the construction 
of nationality. In the century that separates the institution of the first republican model 
from the pluralist Republican model of 1988, this aporia – which simultaneously affirms 
the equality of religions in relation to the state and the non-recognition of some practices 
as religious – sketched, in the religious field, at least one route for its overcoming: 
religious syncretism. 
If until quite recently a consensus prevailed among Brazil’s ruling classes that only 
Catholicism can be recognized as a religion, borrowing some of its more salient 
characteristics had from early on been a strategy of popular non-Christian leaders for 
attaining, if not social legitimacy, at least the guarantee of some state protection. 
The Civil Code of 1916 did not establish a specific legal category for recognizing 
religious organizations that, along with other entities such as scientific and literary 
ones and those that work in public service, must register as private civil not-for-profit 
entities. Argentina had created the General Direction of the National Registrar of Cults 
to control worships, rites, sacred books, positions and theological autonomy of groups 
seeking recognition. But Brazil’s Civil Code understood that religious liberty would be 
better guaranteed if there were no state mechanisms for controlling and monitoring 
these types of registrations. In this way, the legal recognition of the entities required only 
the presentation in a registrar’s office of the by-laws that guide its operation (Giumbelli 
2017). This lenient legal configuration gave margin to the operation of a large variety 
of organizational and ritual combinations that in practice left the distinction unclear 
between the entities that sought protection and legal immunities. Even so, the Catholic 
religion, as the naturalized referent of the religious, served as an implicit guide for less 
traditional forms of organization or those that were not numerically expressive, in their 
aspirations for recognition as specifically religious entities. 
The great flexibility in the legal recognition of these associations combined with the 
ideology of syncretism favored, as an extensive literature has already shown (Ortiz 
1978; Sanchis 1994; Negrão 1996; Giumbelli 1997, and Montero 2003), the modeling 
and re-arranging of a broad variety of popular practices based on a Catholic framework. 
This modeling, constructed over more than a half century of disputes, persecutions 
and alliances, was organized around some basic principles that mirrored the way that 
Catholicism served as a reference for the definition of that which can come to be 
recognized as religious. This included the standardization in manuals, books and other 
written publications of a more or less cohesive doctrinaire universe. It involved the 
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demagnification and re-ordering of practices of cure through the decline of traditional 
authority based on secrecy and  a proposal for collectively sanctioned rituals. The 
idea was also introduced of belief through a concept of the divine that would include a 
break between the immanent and the transcendent, the assimilation of the idea of god 
and of charity. With their more or less developed adoption, these practices were being 
progressively accepted as religious. 
It is interesting to note that although these resignifications have engendered new 
religions recognized as inferior in the hierarchy of religious legitimacy, such as low 
Spiritism, Candomblé, Umbanda and more recently, Santo Daime, these collectives 
were not constituted as religious minorities. This is partially explained by the fact that, 
in the institutional design of Brazilian secularism, the principle of “religious liberty” 
and “state neutrality” and the way that the religious entities were officially recognized, 
guaranteed that “religious belonging” did not become transformed into an official 
primary principle of citizenship for access to public positions, political identities and 
civil rights. In this legal political configuration, the state relinquished defining the scope 
of religion, its content and form of organization. On the other hand, the project of state 
secularity did not remove the influence of the majority religion on political life. To the 
contrary, in name of separation, it progressively imbued state measures with religious 
norms. Thus, in the 1930’s, the Catholic Church reconquered old privileges: the new 
constitution of 1934, despite protests from the Spiritists, Protestants and Masons, 
restored civic recognition to religious marriage, reintroduced religious teaching in 
schools and provided public funding for Church projects (Ranquetat 2012: 68-69). This 
increasingly closer partnership with the state, reinforced in the constitution of 1946, 
favored the broad recognition of Catholicism as the “official religion” and facilitated 
the dissemination and adhesion of part of the educated elites to a public discourse 
of the Catholic Church against “false religions”, “absurd beliefs”, “superstitions”, etc., 
a narrative whose discriminatory power lasted until the mid 1950’s. In the following 
decades, the reduction of the number of clergy, the growth of Protestantism among the 
migrants to the large cities and the advance of political forces of social transformation 
of Marxist inspiration, favored the shift of focus from the action of the Catholic Church 
that came to distance itself from the state toward an increasingly more organized and 
critical engagement in the movements of civil society (Bruneau 1974; Della Cava 1975).
3. The Pluralist Republican Model of Religious Diversity
This panorama of the assimilation of differences via Catholic hegemony and syncretism 
underwent deeper transformations in the 1980’s. On one hand, the expansion of Neo-
Pentecostal Protestantism among the lower and working classes was accompanied 
by an expressive incursion of religious organizations and their leaders in the state 
apparatus, in representative functions and in the communications media, in large part 
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favored by the partnership that they established with the military governments in the 
1970’s, and later, by the space and prerogatives that they conquered in the movement 
to draft the constitution of 1988. On the other hand, the new constitution raised ethnic, 
racial and religious pluralism into a political doctrine. In this new institutional design 
of Brazilian secularism a political transition can be perceived in which the concept of 
“religious equality” gained a new centrality in the political disputes, and often confronted 
the principle of “religious freedom” that had shaped the religious field in the previous 
period. 
The literature about social movements has shown that the redemocratization 
process that began in the late 1980’s favored significant changes in the forms of civil 
associations, stimulating an expressive increase in the desire to create new voluntary 
forms of civil organizations (Avritzer 2012). It is interesting to note that, according to 
data raised by Leonardo Avritzer, most of the organizations that were created since 
this period, at least in São Paulo, were the initiative of religious organizations. Although 
deeper studies are needed to understand how the religious characteristics of these 
associations influence representation and the forms of operation of civic life, it is 
possible to perceive the increasingly significant and diversified presence of religious 
actors in the public sphere, based on a democratic repertoire of collective action, such 
as the organization of petition drives, the convocation of marches and demonstrations, 
the turning to the courts, etc. 
There is no doubt that the increase in density and quality of the participation of these 
religious associations in a non assistentialist form collaborates, in general, to the 
production of a political public culture, that gives less emphasis to the defense of a 
Christian nation than to the autonomy of social actors in relation to the state, and 
mainly a more egalitarian distribution of collective wealth. According to Avritzer, the 
voluntary associations that grew the most were those that were concerned with the 
insertion of the poor in politics. The religious associations, in general, were aimed 
at activities of self-help and organization of the urban poor to demand public goods 
(Avritzer 2012). The associations that belong to the Evangelical Social Action Network 
(RENAS),1 which were committed to the doctrine of misión integral (integral mission), 
affirmed that they were engaged in promoting justice and the dignity of the poor through 
evangelization with social responsibility (Scheliga 2016: 142-143). 
But it is important to indicate the new inflection that was produced in this period in 
the field of civic organizations. Authors such as M. da Glória Gohn (2013) observed 
1 According to Scheliga (2016:128) the official data about RENAS published in 2013 indicate that the 
network, led by historic Protestants, such as Baptists and Presbyterians, affiliated 33 not-for-profit 
organizations, mostly those independent of churches and 24 other networks that each included at 
least ten organizations. The author thus estimates that this universe mobilized approximately 270 
active organizations throughout Brazil. 
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that there was an important change in the nature of these forms of organization in 
the period after enactment of the Constitution of 1988. While the political movement 
of the 1970’s was based on the understanding of the need to strengthen popular 
representation and organize the struggle against exclusion and inequality promoted by 
the state, the 1990’s stimulated the emergence of new organizational networks that, as 
the case of the Evangelical Social Action Network created in 2003 demonstrates well, 
came to defend partnerships with the state in the administration of public policies. Eva 
Scheliga (2016:131-142), who observes the growing importance of this network for 
training evangelical agents engaged in social action, describes this modus operandi as 
a “networking” that is supported by three elements: investment in actions of advocacy 
in support of the rights of children and youth, promotion of political representation of 
Evangelicals in the National Councils for social policies, guarantee of rights and youth, 
and the organization of campaigns for mobilization in the streets, on televised shows, 
in campaigns to raise money for humanitarian causes, etc. 
Thus, we see that the general context of these mutations also affected the forms of 
creating religious organizations. Thus, by instituting pluralism as a political principle, 
the Constitution of 1988 created the opportunity for a social experience of religions 
as being relative to each other, as institutions in competition for social influence and 
primacy in relation to  the state. The new demands raised by the participatory regime 
promoted innovations in the forms of organization of the religious entities and in the 
style of their political action. For the purposes of this essay we can emphasize at least 
two novelties. One concerns the growing incorporation of religious agents, especially 
Protestants, in the spheres of government decision-making, such as forums, councils 
and chambers for interlocution with the state. The other refers to changes in the forms 
of action and mobilization of the public. The participation in events such as marches 
and campaigns, for example, came to be convoked in an ad hoc manner through digital 
networks, and the engagement of volunteers began to be organized sectorally around 
specific projects financed either by the state or by networks of private entrepreneurs, 
as took place in the Catholic projects, “Angels of the Streets” which is concerned 
with the homeless, “Planters of Joy” dedicated to hospital patients and to projects 
of the evangelical churches like “Exodus Brasil” (Gonçalves 2014) which works with 
homosexuals or like the “Projeto Raabe” (Teixeira 2018) which shelters women who 
are victims of domestic violence. 
In terms of the forms of participation and mobilization, however, the way that these 
changes influence the organizations of Catholics and historic Protestants on one 
hand and the charismatic Catholics and Pentecostal Protestants on the other, was not 
exactly the same. 
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In the case of the Catholic Church it is known that the doctrine of “Liberation Theology” 
was one of the most important discursive matrixes in the promotion of the style of 
the popular movements of the 1970’s. In a previous article (Montero et al. 2016) we 
demonstrated that, despite current changes in the organizational form of the civil 
and religious organizations, it can be seen that, in the case of the Catholic Church, 
the archetype subjacent to the recent forms of mobilization remain indebted to the 
standard developed by the movements of the 1970’s. This model of mobilization can 
be characterized by at least three main priorities: the use of the organizational idea of 
human rights as a reference for organizing the diversity of collective experiences in a 
civil language of rights; the perception of the state as an enemy to be fought, which 
makes citizenship the exercise of resistance and politics a field of struggle against 
the state; the idea that civil society is constituted fundamentally by the organization of 
religious variety under a unifying banner of ecumenicalism, or more recently under the 
banner of inter-religious dialogue,  understood as a political arrangement of  Catholic, 
Protestant, Jewish, Buddhist and other differences, among others that, united, 
represent to the Catholic Church and also to sectors of historic Protestants, the group 
of the collective will or of civil society. 
Perhaps the very success of this model and its broad hegemony for nearly three decades 
explains why the Catholic Church has been slower than other religious organizations, 
mainly evangelicals, to adapt to new existing organizational models. In addition, it is 
necessary to observe that this form of circumscribing the civic universe that superimposes 
the political community to the community of creeds (or of ethnic particularities) clearly 
leaves out many other possibilities, in particular, the non-religious that have difficulty 
finding their place in this configuration. In the case of the historic Protestants, who 
since the mid 19th century sought to conduct interdenominational action in defense 
of civil marriage and female insertion in the workplace, they reached the 1960’s in 
harmony with the rising social agenda, defending social justice in alliance with Catholic 
youth. The Catholic ecumenical project provided them an inspiration for overcoming the 
factionalism inherent to the tradition of Brazilian Protestant organizations, and aligned 
them with the Catholic hierarchy, against the military regime. More recently, organized 
in network and inspired by the theology of misión integral (integral mission), they are 
concerned, as we see, in investing in new resources and social technologies to train 
evangelical agents in social promotion and new methods of mobilization of Christians 
and non-Christians, as well as public opinion in general, around specific social causes 
considered to be priorities. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the action of the 
Pentecostals, who aligned with the military regime and gave priority to engagement in 
parliamentary representation and in the media, this Protestant segment is presented 
as less exclusionary, more open to inter-religious dialogue and to collaboration with 
other segments of organized civil society  (Scheliga 138-139).
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Meanwhile, an important change can also be seen in the case of Pentecostal Protestant 
denominations, which until very recently were oriented to communicate only with the 
specific public of their followers.2 Their leaders quickly conquered the abilities needed 
to mobilize, not only their followers, but, above all that portion of the population not 
necessarily engaged in the activities of their churches. Upon doing so they developed 
a combative language, not only against the state or in favor of civil rights, but towards 
a “defense of the Evangelical people”3  when they are criticized by the media and 
for control of religious and moral diversity. An important portion of this Evangelical 
segment is opposed to the principle of religious diversity (and moral pluralism). It can 
be observed that when these segments mobilize they use different operative categories 
than those cited previously to characterize the standards of political imagination  of the 
Catholics and historic Protestants, that is, the guiding idea of human rights, citizenship 
as a field of struggle or as an action that involves a partnership with the state and 
ecumenicalism and inter-religious dialogue as representation of civil society. 
The literature about the Pentecostals, and in particular about the organizations of the 
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus [Universal Church of the Kingdom of God], indicate 
that its public visibility is produced and reproduced more saliently around a few central 
investments: in the growth of its political representation in Congress, in the intensive 
use of the media and in the development of a market of cultural goods, in particular 
gospel music, which became visible in in the multitudes of people who engage in 
the promotion of marches and other public spectacles (Cunha 2004;Machado,M.D 
2006;Machado,C. 2013; Giumbelli 2013;Sant’Ana 2017). Dominion Theology, which 
expanded among these Evangelical segments in the 1990s, proposed a reading of 
evil personified in territorial demons who inhabit Catholic churches, Spiritist centers, 
Umbanda terreiros, as well as entire regions of social life. In this way, the main “political” 
action of these actors, who defend their right to the freedom to expand their message 
2 One of the major questions that challenged scholars of Protestantism was that of the extreme dispersal 
of the religious organizations in various denominations. It became difficult to describe Protestant 
activity in unitary terms. From the perspective of practical politics, this dispersal constituted a great 
challenge. The efforts of some leaders to produce a common political practice across the internal 
divisions of the field had to confront the large variety of institutional forms of organization of these 
churches that varied among the Methodist Episcopal model – in which authority was focused in the 
bishops – and the Congregational Baptist model that gave greater autonomy to the churches, but 
also organized around a convention  (which in 2015 gave rise to the Partido Republicano Brasileiro 
[Brazilian Republican Party]). The defense of autonomy of many churches combined with the idea of 
charisma that required from Pentecostals other arrangements that make possible united actions. The 
expansion of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in the 1980’s, and its strategy of investing 
heavily, along with the Igreja Internacional da Graça [International Grace of God Church] and the 
Igreja Renascer em Cristo [Reborn in Christ Church], in the mass entertainment industry, became an 
important element in the construction of a generic idea of “Evangelical” (Sant’ Ana 2017:47-49).
3 This expression came to circulate in articles produced by the Rede Record, owned by Edir Macedo, 
at times of crises of legitimacy of the institution as in the episode of 1995, in which the Igreja Universal 
do Reino de Deus was portrayed as mercenary and unscrupulous on a telenovela by Brazil’s largest 
TV network Globo (Scheliga 2010).
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of salvation, is to promote the struggle against demons, in order to  “take possession 
for God”  of these social spaces marked by injustice, inequality and immorality  through 
prayer, spiritual war and even physical force. Raquel Sant’Ana (2017) suggests that 
the willingness to participate inspired by this perspective sustains a political project 
whose main strategy is to dispute and guarantee the Christian conquest of the main 
spaces of power, whether in the entertainment industry, parliament, or even in the high 
positions of public administration. 
In this new configuration of participation of the Neo-Pentecoastal religious entities 
in the public sphere, a situation is established which, paradoxically, in the name of 
“religious freedom”, calls for a suppression of plurality of beliefs and opinions. These 
demands are quite evident in the violent actions of certain pastors against Umbanda 
and Candomblé terreiros and in the systematic struggle of Protestant (and Catholic) 
sectors against civil rights related to sexuality. It is interesting to observe here the 
functioning of a dual legal-political standard in the arguments presented by these 
religious actors.
In relation to religious pluralism, protected in this model by state neutrality in relation 
to the diversity of religions, the dispute takes place in the realm of social relations: in 
name of “true religion”, some religious leaders want to limit the public expressions of 
worship that the state recognizes as religious. Curiously, Neo-Pentecoastal segments 
come to defend in parliament and other forums, arguments very similar to those that 
Catholic leaders had used in the previous period to justify not recognizing non-Catholic 
practices as religious. In reaction, the actors harmed, with the support of the agents of 
the judiciary, raise accusations of crimes of intolerance and racism to fight this type of 
violence (Bortoleto 2014).
In relation to the right of freedom of opinion, its restrictions have been constructed around 
the idea of public order, which although it has been removed from the constitution, is 
reintroduced in the political arguments of the actors: sexual rights would place at risk 
the moral order of the family. The tension here is expressed in relation to advances of 
secularism in the control of the domestic order. 
In the first case, the secular and pluralist legal order has served as a more or less secure 
support for impeding the return of religious repression and persecution supported by 
the legal apparatus of the state – even because in this case it no longer has the support 
of the Catholic Church, which as we said, relates religious diversity via the Christian 
model to “inter-religious dialogue”. In the second case, the frontier of the dispute is 
transferred to the legislature where a growing number of religious representatives have 
increasing power. In this arena, the scope of state neutrality, reiterated by the actors as 
a political principle, begins to be redefined in the name of guaranteeing public order, 
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implicitly understood here as a defense of the majority Christian moral order. In relation 
to this issue the Evangelical caucus in parliament has gained the expressive support 
of Catholic legislators. 
4. Conclusion
We can conclude that the secular model that regulated religious diversity until the 1970s 
gave privilege to Catholicism as the religion of the nation and favored the Catholic 
Church as the main partner in policies of administration of popular sovereignty and 
in the construction of nationality. In this configuration of Catholic hegemony, religious 
diversity, the inclusion of Protestants and Jews for example, was openly criticized by 
the ecclesiastic hierarchy as harmful to the nation, which was conceived to be naturally 
Christian, while other popular entities were not even recognized as religious. While 
pluralism was not established as a legal principle, the ideology (and practice) of religious 
syncretism served as a parameter in the dispute for social legitimacy (given that the 
legal mark does not distinguish the civil associations) of the different arrangements 
that sought recognition as religious. 
Meanwhile, the model of pluralist secularism inaugurated with the Constitution of 1988, 
by inscribing differences in the sphere of rights, favored a movement of affirmation 
of religious borders and identities. At the same time, this new legal framework, by 
instituting the construction of citizenship (and no longer nationality) as a reference of 
political action, stimulated religious associations to incorporate the language of social 
promotion4 and individual rights as a form of public action. It also encouraged the 
dispersal of religious activity to all fields of social life. The multiplication of social actions 
of all kinds, including welfare, training, entertainment, assistance and others, aimed 
at specific segments of the public (youth, women, the poor, the incarcerated, drug 
addicts, etc.), made this modus operandi routine in the entire spectrum, particularly the 
Christian portion, of religious entities. 
It is difficult to anticipate what the effects of this dispersal will be on the configuration 
of Brazilian secularism. We can risk hypothesizing the idea that the forms of action of 
Catholic and historic Protestant religious collectives operate with the references of the 
strengthening of a public sphere understood as civil by means of the empowerment 
of collective actors narratively described as victims of injustice. Meanwhile, the modes 
of action of the Pentecostal entities, in particular the Neo-Pentecoastals, appear to 
4 Scheliga (2010: 81-88) describes the process of professionalization of social assistance since the 
1970’s, in Brazil, which led to the distinction between the concept of  “assistentialism”  and the idea 
of “social promotion”. Various NGOs, linked to the Catholic Church and/or ecumenical Protestants, 
became institutionalized in the period, projecting Christian concepts of charity and assistance in 
relation to the concept of the “social question” which came to guide the action of these organizations 
for two decades.  
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emphasize the public sphere, understood as a market, through the empowerment of 
individual actors who, self reconstructed by means of faith and trust, can overcome 
suffering and become masters of their own destiny. 
Independently of the differences in the modes of action in the public sphere, it is necessary 
to emphasize that the recent model of multi-religious secularism operates to guarantee 
public ritual manifestations of all organizations that are legally recognized as religious, 
even if implicit hierarchies organize these modes of presentation. Meanwhile, the 
multiplication of Neo-Pentecoastal leaders in the media, and in particular in parliament, 
certainly challenges the implicit understanding of the distinction between religion and 
money on one hand, and religion and politics on the other, which prevails in the model 
of syncretic secularism. Perhaps by the way that they challenge these demarcations 
– using for example the pulpit to promote candidates or making donations in cash to 
electoral campaigns (practices, that are prohibited by current election laws) or even, 
multiplying the ways of asking for money from the faithful in their services – the Neo-
Pentecoastal leaders have still not been able to earn social respectability, at least 
among the educated elites, Catholics and non-Catholics. It should be noted that Neo-
Pentecoastal leaders are systematically absent from the inter-religious coalitions that, 
by organizing under Catholic leadership to promote big causes, revised the already 
relatively consecrated terms of distinction between the religious and the political – such 
as for example the inter-religious celebration for peace conducted in the Monastery 
of São Bento in 2015, which brought together representatives of Judaism, Islam, 
Buddhism, Spiritists, Afro-religions and the Presbyterian church. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the modus operandi of the Neo-Pentecoastals in the 
context of religious pluralism on one hand, challenges the relatively well established 
understanding about the place of religion in public space as operated in the configuration 
of secularism in the previous model – which presupposes a type of distinction between 
the religious, the political and the market – and on the other, resists the inter-religious 
coalitions that confer stability to this long lasting configuration of secularism. 
When operating at the heart of an inter-religious coalition, a positive general disposition 
is perceived in relation to the broadening of the possibilities for expansion of the religious 
in public and private life, as if a new consensus gradually came to be established among 
the ruling classes that religions in general, and not only Catholicism, can represent a 
positive instrument for social pacification in the competitive context of a plural society. 
This important role offered to the religious entities in the government of the populations 
is not exactly a novelty in the social history of the Brazilian secular state, in which 
for centuries Catechism was considered a central tool for “pacification”, the name 
given to state policies to confront indigenous and African ethnic differences in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But, as we saw, an important portion of the 
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Neo-Pentecoastal segments have not been included in this inter-religious alignment. 
Nevertheless, it is still not possible to define the results of the impact of these new 
disputes over differentiation between the religious and the secular on the stability and 
current hegemonic configuration of Brazilian secularism. 
5. Bibliography
Aguiar, Sylvana (2009): Modernidade no Brasil, Igreja Católica, Identidade Nacional: 
práticas e estratégias intelectuais 1889-1930, Recife: Universidade Federal de 
Pernambuco.
Avritzer, Leonardo (2012): “Sociedade civil e Estado no Brasil: da autonomia à 
interdependência política”, in: Opinião Pública 18, 2, 383–398.
Azzi, Riolando (1977): “O início da Restauração Católica no Brasil: 1920-1930”, in: 
Síntese 4, 10, 61–89.
 (1980): “A Igreja Católica no Brasil durante o Estado Novo”, in: Síntese 7, 19, 
49–71.
Bortoleto, Milton (2014): “Não viemos para fazer aliança”: faces do conflito entre 
adeptos das religiões pentecostais e afro-brasileiras, São Paulo: Universidade 
de São Paulo.
Bruneau, Thomas (1974): Catolicismo Brasileiro em época de transição, São Paulo: 
Edições Loyola.
Carvalho, José Murilo de (1990): A formação das almas: o imaginário da República no 
Brasil, São Paulo: Cia. das Letras.
 (2002): Cidadania no Brasil. O longo caminho, 3a. ed., Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
Brasileira.
Cunha, Magali do Nascimento (2004): Vinho novo em odres velhos. Um olhar 
comunicacional sobre a explosão do gospel no cenário religioso evangélico no 
Brasil, doctoral dissertation, Departamento de Comunicação, USP.
Della Cava, Ralph (1975): “Igreja e Estado no Brasil do século XX: sete monografias 
recentes sobre o catolicismo brasileiro, 1916/1964”, in: Revista Novos Estudos 
CEBRAP 12, 5–52.
Giumbelli, Emerson (1997): O cuidado dos mortos. Uma história da condenação e 
legitimação do Espiritismo, Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional.
 
     Mecila Working Paper Series No. 4, 2018 | 17
(2013): Cultura Pública: envangelicos y su presencia en la sociedad brasileña, in: 
Revista Sociedad y Religión 40, 23, 13–47.
 (2017): “A vida jurídica das igrejas: observações sobre minorias religiosas em 
quatro países (Argentina, Brasil, México e Uruguai)”, in: Religião e Sociedade 
37, 2, 121–143.
Gohn, Maria da Glória (2013): “Sociedade civil no Brasil: movimentos sociais e ONGs”, 
in: Meta: Avaliação 5, 14, 238–253.
Gonçalves, Alexandre Oviedo (2014): Flexibilizando estéticas, restringindo 
sexualidades: disputas de agentes pela demarcação do religioso, Master’s 
thesis, Departamento de Antropologia, USP. 
Lavalle, Adrian Gurza and Szwako, José (2015): “Sociedade civil, Estado e autonomia: 
argumentos, contra-argumentos e avanços no debate”, in Opinião Pública 21, 
1, 157–187. 
Negrão, Lísias Nogueira (1996): Entre a cruz e a encruzilhada. Formação do campo 
umbandista em São Paulo, São Paulo: EDUSP.
Mahmood, Saba (2016): Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Project, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Machado, Carly (2013): “É muita mistura: projetos religiosos, políticos, midiáticos, de 
saúde e segurança pública nas periferias do Rio de Janeiro”, in: Religião e 
Sociedade 33, 13–36.
Machado, Maria das Dores (2006): Política e Religião: a participação dos evangélicos 
nas eleições, Rio de Janeiro: Ed. FGV.
Miceli, Sergio (1988): Elites eclesiásticas brasileiras, Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand 
Brasil.
Montero, Paula (2003): “O problema do sincretismo”, in: Teoria e Sociedade, Special 
Issue, 112–119.
 (2012a): Selvagens, civilizados, autênticos. A produção das diferenças nas 
etnografias salesianas (1920-1970), São Paulo: EDUSP.
 (2012b): “Multiculturalismo, identidades discursivas e espaço público”, in: 
Sociologia e Antropologia 2, 4, 81–102.
 
18 | Montero - Syncretism and Pluralism in the Configuration of Religious Diversity in Brazil
 (2016): “Secularism and Religion in the Public Sphere in Contemporary Brazil”. 
In: Schmidt, Bettina and Engler, Steven (eds.), Handbook of Contemporary 
Religions in Brazil, Leiden: Brill, 379–394.
Montero, Paula; Brum, Asher, and Quintanilha, Rafael (2016): “Ritos católicos e ritos 
civis”, in: Mana 22, 3, 705–735.
Ortiz, Renato (1978): A morte branca do feiticeiro negro, Petrópolis: Vozes.
Ranquetat Jr., Cesar Alberto (2012): Laicidade à brasileira: um estudo sobre as 
controvérsias em torno da presença de símbolos religiosos na Esfera Pública, 
doctoral dissertation, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de 
Pós-Graduação em Antropologia Social, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul.
Sanchis, Pierre (1994): “Para não dizer que não falei de sincretismo”, in: Comunicações 
do ISER 13, 45: 4–11.
Sant’Ana, Raquel (2017): A nação cujo Deus é o Senhor: a imaginação de uma 
coletividade evangélica a partir da Marcha para Jesus, doctoral dissertation, 
Departamento de Antropologia, Museu Nacional, Universidade Federal do Rio 
de Janeiro.
Scheliga, Eva (2016): “Incidência política evangélica: Notas a partir da RENAS”, 
in: Araújo, Melvina and Vital da Cunha, Christina (eds.), Religião e Conflito, 
Curitiba. Editora Prismas, 131-158.
Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers; Shakman Hurd, Elizabeth; Mahmood, Saba, and Danchin, 
Peter (eds.) (2015): Politics of Religious Freedom, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Teixeira, Jacqueline Moraes (2018): A conduta universal: governo de si e políticas 
de gênero na Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, doctoral dissertation, 
Departamento de Antropologia, USP.
Working Papers published since 2017:
1. Maria Sybilla Merian International Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences Conviviality-Inequality in Latin America (Mecila) (2017): 
“Conviviality in Unequal Societies: Perspectives from Latin America: Thematic 
Scope and Preliminary Research Programme”.
2. Müller, Gesine (2018): “Conviviality in (Post)Colonial Societies: Caribbean 
Literature in the Nineteenth Century”.
3. Adloff, Frank (2018): “Practices of Conviviality and the Social and Political Theory 
of Convivialism”.
4. Montero, Paula (2018): “Syncretism and Pluralism in the Configuration of 
Religious Diversity in Brazil”.
The Maria Sibylla Merian International Centre for Advanced Studies in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences Conviviality-Inequality in Latin America (Mecila) was founded 
in April 2017 by three German and four Latin American partner institutions. It is 
being funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) 
for an initial period of three years. The participating researchers will investigate 
coexistence in unequal societies from an interdisciplinary and global perspective. 
The following institutions are involved: Freie Universität Berlin, Ibero-Amerikanisches 
Institut/Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Universität zu Köln, Universidade de 
São Paulo (USP), Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP), 
IdICHS (CONICET/Universidad Nacional de La Plata), and El Colegio de México. 
Further information at http://www.mecila.net.
Contact  
Coordination Office
Maria Sybilla Merian International Centre 
for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences 
Conviviality-Inequality in Latin America
Rua Morgado de Mateus, 615
São Paulo – SP
CEP 04015-902
Brazil
meriancentre@fu-berlin.de
